Gun in Backpack Case: Parents' Assault Charge is Political

When a child is severely injured by another child's possession of a gun, as happened recently in Kitsap County, some parent is probably at fault as well. However, that does not mean the parent is liable to be prosecuted for assault. The charge of assault in the third degree against the mother and her boyfriend who owned the gun distorts the law and is a political charge.

To be guilty of third degree assault requires a showing that the defendant's conduct caused bodily harm accompanied by substantial pain. In virtually all cases of assault with a weapon, the defendant is the one who wielded the weapon. To be sure, one could be an accomplice to the assault, but that person would need to have aided or abetted the crime of assault by actively encouraging, helping, or assisting the assault in some way. Even the police concede that the parent did not place the gun in the boy's backpack nor did the parent tell the boy to go use the gun on someone. The parent was negligent, even reckless, in leaving a loaded gun on a desk, but in no way did their conduct cause the injury, as criminal cases require causation.

Criminal liability cannot rely on a 'hole-in-the-bucket' chain of events to create liability. If parents can be held to answer for an assault here, then the slope is extremely slippery. For example, is a person committing the crime of assisting a suicide if they forget a legally prescribed bottle of oxycodone is in the family medicine cabinet and a depressed young teen finds it and overdoses on it? Or, if a cook leaves a very sharp kitchen knife on the counter and his known, mentally ill nephew grabs it and stabs someone with it, is the cook guilty of assault, too? No of course not! The cook did not commit the assault as there were intervening events between his act and the act of assault. Similarly, the conduct here--leaving a loaded gun on a desk--could have led to any number of outcomes, some bad and many other inconsequential ones which harm no one.

Causation in criminal cases has two components: legal cause and factual cause. The Washington Court Of Appeals in the case of State v. Christman, 160 Wn. App. 741, 753 (2011) is instructive. There, the defendant provided a friend a few methadone pills at a party and the friend died. The defendant was convicted of a "controlled substance homicide" and his conduct was considered a factual or proximate cause of the friend's death, even though the friend's death was also caused by the alcohol and methamphetamine he got elsewhere. Factual or proximate cause means: in its factual context, as “a cause which in a direct sequence unbroken by any new superseding cause, produces the injury complained of and without which such injury would not have happened."

In the Christman case, the defendant's act of giving the controlled substance (methadone) led directly to his friend's death. In contrast, in the Kitsap case, the parent's negligence in leaving a loaded gun in the house, required the child to find it, pick it up, place it in his backpack in a certain way, take it to school, then slam the backpack down in such a way as to discharge the firearm, and thereby wound the nearby schoolgirl. There are four or more intervening steps required here between the conduct and the end result. It is not unbroken. Obviously if the mother or boyfriend had placed the loaded gun in his backpack to ensure that it would go off at the slightest jostle, perhaps then it might be a factual cause.

Even if one stretches the concept of factual cause to include this conduct, then legal cause should slam the door shut. Legal cause means causation by which the court weighs policy considerations in cases where a defendant's act is so removed and attenuated from the result that perhaps liability ought not attach. If reckless endangerment were charged here, there is a good argument that the parent's conduct recklessly endangered the safety of people by leaving a loaded gun around. However, to say that the parent is guilty of an assault ignores the long history of the specific and well known acts that comprise an assault. In short, the parent did not point, shoot or possess the gun at the time the girl was shot. The parent was not present nor did the parent encourage it or actively assist it. None of the traditional acts constituting an assault were present. The parent's conduct, albeit grossly negligent, is not the conduct that led inevitably to the girl's wound. That is why legal cause also does not exist for an assault charge against the mother or her boyfriend.

In the end the mother's and boyfriends actions are too attenuated for an assault charge to lie. But this particular pair is easy to pick on. Presumably they are poor and uneducated, and both have criminal records. What is more, the prosecutor looks good to the community, as its three-piece-suited protector. This case is in sharp contrast with a more recent one in Marysville. There, a very young child grabbed his father's gun out of the glove box, and shot his sister to death, while they were left unattended in the family car by the parents who were nearby. His father happens to be a police officer. Will he be charged with negligent homicide? That may be the better test case, as his negligence is not as attenuated. He was present, he left the gun loaded and easily accessible, and his supervision of young children was wanting. The chain of events is much shorter. Still, prosecutors are loathe to charge police officers and juries tend to let them off. We shall see. . .

Getaway Drivers and Other Accomplices

Even if you don't go in the bank but wait outside in the car, if you know your buddy is armed and goes in the bank, you can be punished just as harshly. This is known as accomplice liability.


The formal law is roughly as follows: If you solicit, encourage, command or request another person to commit a crime, you are as guilty as the one who actually does it. Obviously if you directly aid or assist in the planning or commission of the crime, you are also equally liable for the crime. You do not have to be present at the scene of the crime to be guilty. On the other hand, your mere presence at the crime scene and knowledge of the crime alone are not enough. You have to do something, or encourage, aid, or by your presence, support or encourage THE CRIME. If you are just there but also acting as a 'lookout,' then you are an accomplice.


I capitalized THE CRIME, since the state has to prove that you are involved in the particular crime charged. For example, if you agree to be the lookout for a burglary and your buddy heads toward the house and then assaults someone on the street on the way into the house, you would not be liable for the assault. It is a more complicated question if the person going in the house, assaults or kills someone inside since prosecutors might consider that part of the burglary crime.


In the drive-by shooting case from Ballard H.S. in the mid-1990's, the driver was convicted of murder in the second degree because he "knowingly facilitated the drive-by shooting." The prosecutor argued that old favorite: "in for a dime, in for a dollar." And on appeal the driver argued the jury instructions were misleading and the prosecutor's argument was simplistic and unfair. This area of law is so complex that his appeals went on until just last month. He had won a new trial at one point, but then the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that.


I am involved in a murder case, where I represent an uncharged suspect. In that same case, the alleged driver to the murder scene is currently on trial. His defense is that he had no idea that the two men in his car would later shoot the victim in front of a bar. The state probably can prove he had parked the car some distance away while he waited in the car. So the question will be whether they can prove he did so, knowing of their design to shoot when they left the car.


Another case I have is that of a young man accused of starting a fight outside a bar, where the 'victim' voluntarily went outside to confront him. Ordinarily that would be a misdemeanor assault. (A mutual fight is no defense for the person who threw the first punch.) However, when the two were grappling, my client's friend began punching and kicking the victim. The friend's blows caused the victim a fractured nose and cheek bone. My client did not do any serious damage. Yet my client is charged with a felony assault in the second degree. There, the issue will be if they were acting in concert or if the friend, unbidden by my client, just jumped in and acted on his own.


In federal court, the prosecutors frequently charge conspiracy crimes. In such a case, a person can be guilty when (1) two or more people agree to commit a crime, (2) when the accused joins this group knowing of its criminal purpose and intending to help it, and (3) someone performs an overt act for the purpose of carrying out the conspiracy. Take a mortgage fraud scheme, where people lie on their applications to get the loan. And then, never intending to live there, turn the property over to others who try to flip it at a higher price. Even if the person who filled out the application never benefitted from the scheme, a conspiracy charge would lie.

Another problem for co-conspirators, for example, is the schlep who agrees to move the hockey bag with marijuana it over the border. The schlep may be facing as much time as the owners of the dope. I like to explain this with the Macdonald's analogy. Imagine if making burgers were illegal like cocaine is. Then if you agree to flip some burgers for one of the golden arch stores, you are potentially liable for all of the whole corporate output. After all, everyone knows the signs say 'so many billions sold. . .' Of course the schlep could say he didn't know there were 100's of hockey bags involved. Perhaps. . .

In short, choose your friends carefully and don't do any favors such as carrying that bundle across the border . . .